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Abstract
Can the structure of asset markets change the way monetary policy should be
conducted? Following a linear-quadratic approach, the present paper addresses
this question in a New Keynesian small open economy framework. Our results
reveal that the conguration of asset markets signicantly a¤ects optimal monetary
policy and the performance of standard policy rules. In particular, when comparing
complete and incomplete markets, the ranking of policy rules is entirely reversed,
and so are the policy prescriptions regarding the optimal level of exchange rate
volatility.
JEL Classication: F41, G15, E52 and E61. Keywords: Welfare, Optimal
Monetary Policy, Asset Markets, Small Open Economy.
1 Introduction
How does the structure of international asset markets a¤ect monetary policy? The debate
surrounding optimal monetary policy in open economies has been extensive over the
past decade. Many works have emphasized that optimal monetary policy in an open
economy may be inuenced the presence of a "terms of trade externality". Part of
the literature highlights the fact that the presence of such an externality can a¤ect the
optimality of inward looking policies. But are these policy incentives a¤ected by the
degree of international risk sharing? The current paper characterizes a utility-based loss
function for a small open economy under di¤erent asset market structures and derives
the corresponding optimal monetary policy. Our analysis shows that the degree of risk
sharing can signicantly a¤ect the optimal policy prescription and the performance of
standard policy rules.
Early contributions on optimal monetary policymaking in an open economy, such as
Clarida et al. (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2005), show the policy problem in an open
economy may be isomorphic to the one in a closed economy environment. Their results
suggest that policymakers in an open economy should follow a purely inward looking
policy, responding solely to movements in domestic prices (or producer prices). Hence,
there is no role for exchange rate stabilization, even if movements in the exchange rate
a¤ect consumer prices.
However, recent theoretical literature on policy objectives in open economies suggests
that this result is not a robust one. As emphasized in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998), welfare
in an open economy can be inuenced by a terms of trade externality. This externality
arises because imported goods may not be perfect substitutes to goods produced domes-
tically. This fact implies that a social planner in an open economy may wish to exploit
a certain degree of monopoly power.1 Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) analyze welfare and
monetary policy in a setting characterized by this external distortion - related to the
countrys monopoly power in trade - and an internal distortion related to monopolistic
supply in the domestic market. The internal distortion implies that monetary surprises
can increase output towards its e¢ cient level. But in open economies these surprises also
reduce domestic consumerspurchasing power internationally. Because of the latter ef-
fect, expansionary policies can reduce welfare. As emphasized in Tille (2001), the overall
impact of such shocks depends on the relative size of these two distortions.2
In a complete markets setting, Benigno and Benigno (2003) explore the consequences
of such internal and external distortions for monetary policy cooperation in a stochastic
two-country framework. De Paoli (2009) analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small
open economy setting.3 These studies show that, if policymakers in di¤erent countries
act independently, they may have an incentive to a¤ect the terms of trade in their own
advantage. If domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes, an improvement in the
terms of trade can induce agents to consume more imported goods (that is, terms of
trade improvements have a so-called expenditure-switching e¤ect). These consumers are
better o¤, since they can reduce their labor e¤ort without a corresponding fall in their
consumption levels. A terms of trade improvement (or a real exchange rate appreciation)
ceases to be welfare improving when these elasticities are small, and the terms of trade
cannot divert consumption towards foreign goods. In this case, a more depreciated real
exchange rate on average can be welfare improving. Moreover, unless countries are insular
to terms of trade movements, domestic ination targeting is no longer the policy choice
of individual countries.
The present paper evaluates whether or not the above policy incentives are inuenced
by the degree of international risk sharing. Our analysis conrms that, under complete
markets and a high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign, there is a
policy incentive to engineer a terms of trade improvement (or a real exchange rate ap-
1This externality is also discussed in the trade theory context. The literature on trade policy points
out that imposing taxes on exports might be welfare improving because, due to imperfect substitutability
between the domestic and foreign goods, it is in the countrys interest to behave like a monopolist and
restrict its supply of exports.
2Tille (2001) shows that the overall impact of changes in money supply depends on the degree of
substitutability between goods produced within a country and the degree of substitutability between
goods produced in di¤erent countries.
3Many other studies analyze welfare and monetary policy in di¤erent open economy settings. For
alternative works investigating the case for exchange rate stabilization see, for example, Devereux and
Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Sutherland (2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006). Note that
there is an earlier literature, based on models without explicit intertemporal microfoundations, which
already spell out that terms of trade spillovers can create an externality and, thus, scope for monetary
policy coordination. See Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) for an exposition.
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preciation). Moreover, in this case, a exchange rate peg can outperform (that is, lead
to higher welfare) a policy that focus on domestic price stabilization. This is because a
xed exchange rate regime ties policymakers hands who, for this reason, under-stabilize
output relative to the exible price allocation. When compared with price stability, this
regime is associated with a lower level of output and a more appreciated real exchange
rate on average.
However, the results are di¤erent in the case of imperfect risk sharing. Whereas
e¢ cient risk sharing severs the link between domestic consumption and domestic produc-
tion, with incomplete markets these are more tightly related. Under nancial autarky,
for example, consumption has to be fully nanced by domestic output. So, while in the
complete markets setting, optimal risk sharing prevents home agents from su¤ering neg-
ative income e¤ects if they were to reduce domestic production and engineer a terms of
trade improvement, this is no longer the case under incomplete markets. That is, under
imperfect risk sharing it may no longer be possible to decrease agents disutility from
producing domestically without decreasing their utility from consumption. In fact, under
incomplete markets, a policy of exchange rate stabilization would only be benecial if
the degree of substitutability between home and foreign good is low. This is because a
low elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods reduces the negative
income e¤ect of terms of trade improvement on consumption.
Therefore, our welfare comparison highlights that while an exchange rate peg may
outperform a domestic ination targeting regime when asset markets are complete and
domestic and imported goods are substitutes, the opposite holds when asset markets are
incomplete. Our results suggest that optimal monetary policymaking in a small open
economy crucially depend on the degree of substitutability between goods and the degree
of international risk sharing.
In terms of our modelling approach, we characterize a small open economy frame-
work as a limiting case of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. The base-
line framework features monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and home bias in
consumption. In our analysis we consider three di¤erent asset markets specication:
complete asset markets (optimal international risk sharing), incomplete asset markets
(sub-optimal international risk sharing) and nancial autarky (absence of international
risk sharing).
Our policy evaluation methodology follows the linear quadratic approach developed
by Benigno andWoodford (2005) and Sutherland (2002), and characterizes a utility-based
loss function for the di¤erent asset market settings. The method delivers an analytical
representation of the policy problem that is similar to the one used in the traditional
literature on monetary policy evaluation (that is, policymakers minimize a quadratic loss
function subject to linear constraints). But the utility-based loss function for the small
open economy depends not only on the volatility of output and domestic ination but also
on the real exchange rate volatility. Moreover, the weights of these variables in the loss
function depend on the form of asset markets. Finally, we derive the optimal monetary
policy for the di¤erent settings and represent it in terms of a targeting rule à la Svensson
(2003).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
The system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions is presented in Section 3. In Section
4 we derive welfare and Subsection 4.1 presents the linear-quadratic loss function. The
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analysis of monetary policy under di¤erent asset market structure is illustrated in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The framework consists of a small open economy setup derived from two-country dynamic
general equilibrium model. The baseline framework is fairly standard, following the work
of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009). Nevertheless, in our analysis, we
consider three di¤erent asset market specications. These are presented in Subsection
2.1.
In the model deviations from purchasing power parity arise from the existence of home
bias in consumption. This bias depends on the degree of openness and the relative size
of the economy. The specication allows us to characterize the small open economy by
taking the limit of the home economy size to zero. Prior to applying the limit, we derive
the optimal equilibrium conditions for the general two-country model. After the limit is
taken, the two countries, Home and Foreign, represent the small open economy and the
rest of the world, respectively.
Monopolistic competition and sticky prices are introduced in order to address issues
of monetary policy. We further assume that home price setting follows a Calvo-type
contract, which introduces richer dynamic e¤ects of monetary policy than in a setup
where prices are set one period in advance. Moreover, we abstract from monetary frictions
by considering a cashless economy as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
Preferences
We consider two countries, H (Home) and F (Foreign). The world economy is pop-
ulated with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the segment
[0; n) belongs to country H and the population in the segment (n; 1] belongs to country
F . The utility function of a consumer j in country H is given by4
Ut = Et
1X
s=t
s t

U(Cs)  1
n
Z n
0
V (yjs; s)dj

; (1)
Households obtain utility from consumption U(Cj) and contribute to the production
of all domestic goods yj attaining disutility 1
n
R n
0
V (yjs; s)dj. Risk is pooled internally
to the extent that agents participate in the production of all goods and receive an equal
share of production revenue. Productivity shocks are denoted by s, and C is a C.E.S.
(constant elasticity of substitution) aggregate of home and foreign goods, dened by
C =
h
v
1
C
 1

H + (1  v)
1
C
 1

F
i 
 1
: (2)
The parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign-produced goods, CH and CF . As in Sutherland (2005), the parameter determining
home consumerspreferences for foreign goods, (1   v); is a function of the relative size
4In the subsequent sections, we assume the following isoelastic functional forms: U(Ct) =
C1 t
1  and
V (yt; "Y;t) =
" Y;ty
1+
t
1+ ; where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and  is equivalent to the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply.
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of the foreign economy, (1   n), and of the degree of openness, ; more specically,
(1  v) = (1  n):
Similar preferences are specied for the rest of the world
C =
h
v
1
C
  1

H + (1  v)
1
C
  1

F
i 
 1
; (3)
with v = n. That is, foreign consumerspreferences for home goods depend on the
relative size of the home economy and the degree of openness. Note that the specication
of v and v generates a home bias in consumption.
The sub-indices CH (CH) and CF (C

F ) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the dif-
ferentiated products produced in countries H and F . These are dened as follows
CH =
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
; CF =
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
; (4)
CH =
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
; CF =
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
; (5)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products. The
consumption-based price indices that correspond to the above specications of preferences
are given by
P =
h
vP 1 H + (1  v) (PF )1 
i 1
1 
; (6)
and
P  =
h
vP 1 H + (1  v) (P F )1 
i 1
1 
; (7)
where PH (P H) is the price sub-index for home-produced goods expressed in the domestic
(foreign) currency and PF (P F ) is the price sub-index for foreign produced goods expressed
in the domestic (foreign) currency:
PH =

1
n
Z n
0
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
; PF =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
; (8)
P H =

1
n
Z n
0
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
; P F =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
: (9)
We assume that the law of one price holds, so
p(h) = Sp(h) and p(f) = Sp(f); (10)
where the nominal exchange rate, St; denotes the price of foreign currency in terms
of domestic currency. Equations (6) and (7), together with condition (10), imply that
PH = SP

H and PF = SP

F . However, as Equations (8) and (9) illustrate, the home bias
specication leads to deviations from purchasing power parity; that is, P 6= SP  For this
reason, we dene the real exchange rate as Q  SP 
P
:
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From consumerspreferences, we can derive the total demand for a generic good h,
produced in country H, and the demand for a good f; produced in country F
ydt (h) =

pt(h)
PH;t
 (
PH;t
Pt
  "
vCt +
v(1  n)
n

1
Qt
 
Ct
#
+Gt
)
; (11)
ydt (f) =

pt(f)
PF;t
 (
PF;t
Pt
  "
(1  v)n
1  n Ct + (1  v
)

1
Qt
 
Ct
#
+Gt
)
; (12)
where Gt and Gt are the country-specic government shocks. We assume that the public
sector in the Home (Foreign) economy only consumes Home (Foreign) goods and has
preferences for di¤erentiated goods analogous to the ones of the private sector (given
by Equations 4 and 5). The government budget constraints in the Home and Foreign
economy are respectively given by
t
Z n
0
pt(h)yt(h)dh = nPH;t(Gt + Trt) (13)
and
t
Z 1
n
pt (f)y

t (f)dh = (1  n)PF;t(Gt + Trt ): (14)
Fluctuations in proportional taxes, t ( t ), or government spending, Gt (G

t ), are exoge-
nous and completely nanced by lump-sum transfers, Trt (Trt ); made in the form of
domestic (foreign) goods.
Finally, to portray our small open economy, we use the denition of v and v and take
the limit for n! 0. Consequently, conditions (11) and (12) can be rewritten as
yd(h) =

pt(h)
PH;t
 (
PH;t
Pt
  "
(1  )Ct + 

1
Qt
 
Ct
#
+Gt
)
; (15)
yd(f) =
"
pt (f)
P F;t
# (
P F;t
P t
 
Ct +G

t
)
: (16)
Equations (15) and (16) show that external changes in consumption a¤ect demand in
the small open economy, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, movements in the real
exchange rate do not a¤ect the rest of the worlds demand.
Price-setting Mechanism
Prices follow a partial adjustment rule à la Calvo (1983). Producers of di¤erentiated
goods know the form of their individual demand functions (given by Equations (15) and
(16)), and maximize prots taking overall market prices and products as given. In each
period a fraction,  2 [0; 1); of randomly chosen producers is not allowed to change
the nominal price of the goods they produce. The remaining fraction of rms, given by
(1 ); chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected discounted value of prots.
The optimal choice of producers that can set their price ~pt(j) at time T is, therefore
Et
(X
()T tUc(CT )

~pt(j)
PH;T
 
YH;T

~pt(j)
PH;T
PH;T
PT
  Vy (~yt;T (j); "t)
(1  T )(   1)Uc(CT )
)
= 0:
(17)
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Monopolistic competition in production leads to a wedge between marginal utility of
consumption and marginal disutility of production. We allow for uctuations in this wedge
by assuming a time-varying proportional tax t. Hereafter, we refer to these uctuations
as markup shocksMt, whereMt = (1 t)( 1) .5
Given the Calvo-type setup, the price index evolves according to the following law of
motion,
(PH;t)
1  = P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) (~pt(h))1  : (18)
The rest of the world has an analogous price setting mechanism.
2.1 Asset Markets
The structure of nancial markets can signicantly alter the way idiosyncratic shocks
a¤ect consumption, output and other macroeconomic variables. As described in Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1996, Chapter 5), The presence of international markets for risky assets
weakens and may sever the link between shocks to a countrys output or factor productivity
and shocks to its residents income. Sophisticated international nancial markets thus
force us to rethink the channels through which macroeconomic shocks impinge on the
world economy.
In this Section, we introduce three di¤erent specications for asset market structure.
First, we present the scenario in which international nancial markets are incomplete, by
assuming that agents can internationally trade nominal riskless bonds subject to interme-
diation costs. Then we describe two benchmark cases of asset market structure: at one
extreme, we analyze the case of nancial autarky, in which the small open economy has
no access to international nancial markets; at the other, we examine the most developed
form of capital markets, in which households have access to a complete set of contingent
claims.
Incomplete Markets
We characterize the environment of incomplete markets by assuming that agents can
trade nominal riskless bonds denominated in Home and Foreign currency. We consider
that home-currency denominated bonds are only traded domestically. Moreover, follow-
ing Turnovsky (1985), the international trade of foreign currency-denominated bonds is
subject to intermediation costs.6 This cost is proportional to the countrys aggregate
net foreign asset position. If the small open economy is a net debtor, its agents pay a
premium on the foreign interest rates when borrowing from abroad. On the other hand,
if the country is a net creditor, households lending in foreign currency receive a rate of
return lower than foreign interest rates. The spread is the remuneration of international
intermediaries, and is assumed to be rebated equally among foreign households.
The intermediation cost assumption is introduced for technical reasons: it solves the
stationarity problem in the style of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995).7 By ensuring that the
5Time-varying taxes introduce ine¢ cient uctuations in the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and goods production. We interpret them as markup shocks since, e¤ectively, changes in
taxes are passes from rms to consumers as changes in rmsmarkup over their marginal cost. Note that
we could have obtained the same source of disturbances if, for example, we had introduced a time-varying
elasticity of substitution  (as in Clarida et al (2002)), or a time-varying monopoly power of wage setters
(as Woodford (2003)).
6This specication was also recently used in Benigno (2001).
7See Ghironi.(2006) for a comprehensive discussion.
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model is stationary, this assumption guarantees the precision of any quantitative exercises
involving a log linear version of the model. In addition, it allows for the examination of the
second moments of macroeconomic variables. Nevertheless, for some of our qualitative
analysis, we consider the case of zero intermediation costs. This is done in order to
simplify the analytical derivation of the optimal plan and improve our intuition on the
policy prescriptions under incomplete markets.
We can write the households budget constraint at Home as follows:
PtCt+
BH;t
(1 + it)
+
StBF;t
(1 + it ) 

StBF;t
Pt
  BH;t 1+StBF;t 1+(1  t) R n0 pt(h)yt(h)dh
n
+PH;tTrt;
(19)
where BH;t and BF;t denote domestic-currency and foreign-currency denominated nominal
bonds and Trt are government transfers, made in the form of domestic goods. The
function  () represents the cost from international borrowings and it is increasing in the
aggregate level of foreign debt:  
0
(:) < 0. We further assume a zero steady-state risk
premium by setting  
 
BF

= 1. Moreover, in specifying the budget constraint (19), we
also assume that households in a given country produce all goods and share the revenues
from production in equal proportions. So, given that idiosyncratic risk is pooled among
domestic households, and foreign households only trade foreign-currency denominated
bonds, domestic-currency denominated bonds are in zero net supply. That is, in reality
only foreign-currency denominated bonds are traded in equilibrium.8 As a result, dening
the intermediation costs over the foreign currency bond only is su¢ cient to pin down the
overall steady-state net foreign asset position.
We also consider the case in which the initial wealth of all households within a country
are equal. In e¤ect, households in the same country face the same budget constraints in
every period and state of the world. That is, we can consider a representative consumer
for each economy. But even though idiosyncratic risk is pooled among households from
the same country, there is imperfect risk sharing across borders.
Foreign households are assumed to trade only in foreign currency bonds. Thus, their
budget constraint can be written as
P t C
i
t +
BF;t
(1 + it )
 BF;t 1 +
(1   t )
R 1
1 n p(f)yt(f)dh
1  n + P

t Tr

t +
K
1  n: (20)
The intermediation prots K; which are shared equally among foreign households,
can be written as
K =
BF;t
P t (1 + it )
241  Qt
 

StBF;t
Pt

35 : (21)
Given the above specication, we can write the consumers intertemporal optimal
choices as
UC (Ct) = (1 + it)Et

UC (Ct+1)
Pt
Pt+1

; (22)
UC (C

t ) = (1 + i

t )Et

UC
 
Ct+1
 P t
P t+1

; (23)
8The present framework does not include a portfolio problem for households. For recent contribu-
tions on optimal international portfolios in incomplete markets settings, see, for example, Devereux and
Sutherland (2007) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2005).
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and
UC (Ct) = (1 + i

t ) 

Stbt
Pt

Et

UC (Ct+1)
St+1Pt
StPt+1

; (24)
where Equation (22) results from the small open economy optimal choice of home-
currency denominated bonds. Equations (23) and (24) are Foreign and Home Euler
equations derived from the optimal choice of foreign-currency denominated bonds. More-
over, Equations (22) and (24) imply that there is an interest rate di¤erential across
countries.
Financial Autarky
In this setup, the economy does not have access to international borrowing or lending.
Consequently, there is no risk sharing across borders. As in the case of incomplete
markets, we assume that there is a symmetric initial distribution of wealth across domestic
agents.
The household budget constraints, at Home and abroad, can be written as
PtCt 
(1  t)
R n
0
pt(h)yt(h)dh
n
+ PH;tTrt (25)
and
P t C
i
t 
(1   t )
R 1
1 n p(f)yt(f)dh
1  n + P

t Tr

t : (26)
Under nancial autarky, the value of domestic production has to be equal to the level
of public and private consumption in nominal terms. Aggregating private and public
budget constraints, we have:
PH(Yt  Gt) = PtCt (27)
The inability to trade bonds with the rest of the world imposes that the value of imports
should equal the value of exports:
(1  n)StP H;tCH;t = nPF;tCF;t: (28)
Complete Markets
Following Chari et al (2002), the complete market environment is introduced by as-
suming that agents in the small open economy have access to state contingent claims
that allow them to optimally share risk with the rest of the world. In particular, we as-
sume that agents meet and trade state contingent nancial assets before monetary policy
decisions are made. In our setting, agents have access to a full set of claims, contingent
on all possible states of nature (resulting from di¤erent realizations of shocks and policy
decisions). Thus, in e¤ect, agents are insured against the uncertainty implied by the
choice of monetary regime. This asset market structure implies the following risk sharing
condition
UC (C

t )
UC (Ct)
=
StP

t
Pt
: (29)
But as shown in Senay and Sutherland (2007), if one considers a setup in which asset
are traded after policy takes place and individuals cannot insure against policy choices,
the above condition no longer holds. Moreover, the authors show that the timing of
9
asset trades can have signicant implication for policy analysis. In the current work
we maintain the assumption that assets are traded before policy throughout the text,
but we recognize that relaxing this assumption can have interesting implications for the
analysis of monetary policy under alternative asset market structures. More specically,
if we assumed an alternative setting in which assets were traded after policy, we would
be e¤ectively changing the level of insurance nancial markets provide. So, this setting
could lead to economic dynamics which are closer to the ones obtained under incomplete
markets or nancial autarky.9 This fact could, in turn, reduce the di¤erences in the opti-
mal policy prescriptions under alternative asset market specications. We, nevertheless,
leave the formal analysis of this specication for future research.
3 Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
In the current Section we present a summary of the models equilibrium conditions in log-
deviations from steady state. In the previous section we present a general version of the
model, while the log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions described below imposes
some restrictions on parameter values and steady-state conditions. In particular, we
assume a log-utility function (i.e.  = 1). Moreover, we consider the case of a symmetric
steady state which implies a zero steady-state net foreign asset position (that is, BF = 0,
where upper-bar indicates a steady-state condition). The implication of these restrictions
are discussed in Section 5.1.2, where such assumptions are relaxed.
The system of equilibrium conditions for the small open economy can be described by
an aggregate supply, an aggregate demand and an equilibrium condition(s) implied by
the nancial market structure. These can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3, which represent,
respectively, the case of complete markets, nancial autarky and incomplete markets.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Lower case variables are expressed in log deviations from steady-state, gt  log(Gt= Y )
and t  log(Mt). In summary: ct and ct denote domestic and foreign consumption,
yt denotes domestic output, qt denotes the real exchange rate, bt represents net foreign
assets (expressed in real terms) and t represents domestic (or producer price) ination.
The stochastic environment is characterized by the presence of productivity shocks "t,
scal shocks gt, and markup shocks t. The parameters of the model are described in
Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Equation (AS) represents the small open economys Phillips curve. Note that the
exible price allocation is identical to the equilibrium allocation that would prevail were
policymakers to target domestic ination. That is, the case in which  ! 0 and, there-
fore, k ! 1; is equivalent to the case in which t = 0, rt. Equation (AD) illustrates
9In Senay and Sutherland (2007) the assumption that assets are traded after policy decisions are made
implies that, ex-ante, the value of domestic consumption has to be nanced by domestic consumption
condition which holds ex-post under nancial autarky. This can be veried by inspection of equation
(3) and (6) in the referred paper.
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how the demand for the small open economys products depends on foreign and domestic
consumption. Equation (CM) in Table 1 is derived from the complete market assumption,
and represents the optimal risk sharing agreement between agents in the small economy
and agents in the rest of the world. In Table 2, which summarizes the equilibrium condi-
tions under nancial autarky, Equation (FA) represents the aggregate resource constraint.
This Equation illustrates that under nancial autarky, domestic consumption has to be
fully nanced by domestic production. Finally, in the case of market incompleteness
(Table 3), combining domestic and foreign Euler equations, we derive Equation (IM).
Moreover, in this setup, the aggregate budget constraint of the small open economy can
be written as (IM0):
Given domestic exogenous shocks "t, gt, and t, and external conditions, ct , the small
open economy system of equilibrium conditions is closed by specifying the monetary
policy rule. In the next sections we examine di¤erent specications for this rule. Apart
from analyzing the optimal monetary policy regime, we evaluate the performance of
alternative policy rules such as an exchange rate peg, and both consumer price index
(CPI) and producer price index (PPI) ination targeting regimes.
Foreign dynamics are governed by foreign supply and demand conditions (AS and
AD):
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The specication of the foreign policy rule completes the system of equilibrium con-
ditions which determine the evolution of yt ; c
 and t . For simplicity, and without loss
of generality, we assume that the foreign economy targets domestic ination (i.e. sets
t = 0, rt).10 We should note that the dynamics of the rest of the world are not a¤ected
by Home variables. Therefore, the small open economy can treat ct as an exogenous
shock.
4 Welfare
In this Section we present the objective function and the optimal monetary policy plan
for the small open economy, under the di¤erent asset market structures. We should note
that, for clarity of the exposition, in the sections to follow we assume a specic level for
this markup (in particular, we set M = (1   ) 1, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005)).
This parameterization guarantees that the steady state is e¢ cient when the elasticity of
intratemporal and intertemporal substitution are unitary, or when the economy is closed.
We relax this assumption in Section 5.1.2.
In a microfounded model, welfare can be directly obtained from householdsutility.
Therefore, we obtain the monetary authoritys objective function, which should reect
the economys level of welfare, from a second-order Taylor expansion of this utility:
Lto = (1  )Uc CEt0
X
t

dt +
1
2
( + 1)(yt   y0t)2 +
1
2

k
(t)
2

+ t:i:p+O(jjjj3): (30)
10Since the policy choice in the rest of the world determines how the endogenous variables respond to
structural shocks, it may also a¤ect the correlation between ct and 

t . But in the case of a symmetric
steady state, the system of equilibrium conditions in the small open economy is only a¤ected by ct .
Thus, in this case, the policy choice of the rest of the world is irrelevant for the dynamics of the small
open economy.
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The term t:i:p. stands for terms independent of policy (in particular, these refer to
exogenous shocks that are not a¤ected by the policy choice) and O(jjjj3) refers to terms
of order strictly higher than two. In addition, we dene dt  yt  1(1 )ct and y0t  (+1)"t:
Note that, in the case of a closed economy, in which  = 0, the term dt is eliminated from
the above expression. Moreover, when markup shocks are absent, y0t coincides with the
exible price allocation, or equivalently, the equilibrium allocation that would prevail if
a policy of price stability is implemented. In other words, in this specication of a closed
economy, there is no trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and the output gap.
But as described in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), in
an open economy welfare is inuenced by an external distortion that gives rise to a terms
of trade externality. Such a distortion arises because imported goods are not perfect
substitutes to goods produced domestically, and, as a result, a social planner in an open
economy may wish to exploit a certain degree of monopoly power. Thus, apart from
nominal rigidities, welfare in our small open economy is a¤ected an internal monopolistic
distortion as well as an external distortion. The presence of these distortions can be
illustrated by the term dt in the loss function.
Importantly, the implication of these distortions depends on the asset market struc-
ture. We can illustrate this fact by comparing the complete markets specication with
the case of nancial autarky. By inspection of Table 1 and Table 2 we can see that while
under complete markets the term dt can be written as a function of E[(1   )qt]; under
nancial autarky, this term depends on E[(   1)qt].11 Therefore, while a more appre-
ciated real exchange rate on average is welfare improving under complete markets and
substitute goods ( > 1), the opposite holds under nancial autarky.12
Under complete markets, when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the
utility an real exchange rate appreciation can improve welfare by decreasing the disutility
of producing at home without an equivalent reduction in the utility of consumption.
But while the complete markets assumption prevents agents in the small economy from
experiencing negative income e¤ects (were they to reduce their production levels), under
nancial autarky this would no longer be the case. When domestic agents have no access
to international asset markets, domestic agents borrowing constraints imply a tight link
between domestic consumption and income. In this case, if goods are substitutes an
appreciated real exchange rate is actually welfare inferior, as it induces a lower demand
for domestic goods and, thus, lower domestic income. Lower domestic income, in turn,
decreases consumption and welfare.
On the other hand, when goods are complements in the utility (i.e. when  < 1),
under complete markets a more depreciated unconditional mean of the real exchange rate
increases welfare by creating a rise in consumption utility larger than the rise in labor
disutility. And, in this case, an appreciated exchange rate could improve welfare under
nancial autarky. For small values of , output would fall little relative the movement in
11Using a rst-order approximation of demand equation and the risk sharing condition, we can write
dt as a function of  and qt. However, the full welfare implications of the linear term can only be accessed
when this term is approximated to second order. This is properly taken into account in the loss function
derivation presented in the next Section.
12In the case of log utility, when  > 1 the marginal utility of consuming domestic goods increases with
the consumption of foreign goods (and vice-versa). Thus, these goods are substitutes in the utility.
When  < 1, domestic and foreign goods are complements in the utility, as the marginal utility of
consuming one good falls with the consumption of the other good. But in the general case of CRRA
utility, this condition also depends on the coe¢ cient of risk aversion : In particular, goods are substitutes
(complements) in the utility when  > 1 ( < 1).
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real exchange rate, and the e¤ect of the appreciation on agentspurchasing power would
outweigh the reduction in output.
In the knife-edge case in which the marginal utility of consuming one good does not
depend on the consumption of the other good (i.e. when  = 1), welfare would not
depend on the level of the real exchange rate. Under this specication, the economy
never experiences trade imbalances and the dynamics of the current account and the
asset market structure are irrelevant.13 As a result, the welfare characterization is also
independent of the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, the real exchange rate externality
is eliminated and the utility-based loss function becomes isomorphic to the one in a closed
economy.
4.1 The Linear-quadratic Loss Function
In order to obtain an approximation of the optimal plan that is fully accurate to second-
order, we follow the linear-quadratic approach of Benigno and Woodford (2005) and
Sutherland (2002).14 We eliminate the linear term dt in the Taylor expansion, using a
second-order approximation of the models equilibrium conditions. Because alternative
asset market characterizations imply di¤erent equilibrium conditions, the nal expression
for welfare varies according to the structure of the asset market. The resulting objective
function can be expressed as
Lto = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
lmyyy
2
t + l
m
yqytqt +
1
2
lmqqq
2
t +
1
2
lm 
2
t
+Lm
0
ey etyt + L
m0
eq etqt

+ t:i:pm +O(jjjj3):15 (31)
The weights lmyy; l
m
qq; l
m
yq; l
m
 ; and the vectors L
m
ey and L
m
eq depend on the structural para-
meters of the model and on the asset market conguration. In what follows we let the
superscript m = c represent the case of complete markets, while m = fa is the nan-
cial autarky setup and the incomplete market case is denoted by m = i. The vector of
exogenous variables, et; is dened as:
et =

"t t gt c

t

;
Even though the weights in the loss function are a complex function of structural parame-
ters, we can show that when domestic and foreign goods are substitutes (complements) in
the utility function, ination variability is less (more) costly if asset markets are complete.
In particular, the weight of ination in the loss function, l; can be expressed as:
13The irrelevance of the asset market structure under this specication has been extensively discussed
in the literature (e.g. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Benigno (2001), among
others).
14Chari et al. (1994, 1995) suggest that the linear-quadratic approach may lead to an inaccurate
approximation of the optimal policy problem. However, as explained in Benigno and Woodford (2006a,
2006b), their analysis is based on a "naïve" linear-quadratic approximation of the policy problem. As
emphasized by Judd (1996, 1999), in order to obtain an approximation of the optimal plan that is fully
accurate to second-order, the e¤ect of second moments on the mean of the variables should be taken into
account. The linear-quadratic approach adopted in this paper incorporates these e¤ects by obtaining
a purely quadratic approximation for the policy objective. Indeed, Benigno and Woodford (2006a,
2006b) demonstrate that a purely quadratic representation of the loss function leads to the correct local
approximation of the problem for small enough disturbances.
15The second order approximation of the model and the full derivation of the loss function can be
found in our Technical Appendix, which is available upon request. This appendix also contains a detailed
derivation of the complete markets specication and the full derivation of the optimal monetary plan.
13
li = l
fa
 =
(1  )
k

1 + l

(l + 1)(1  )

and
lc =
(1  )
k

1  l ( + 1)
(1 + ) + l

where l = (   1)(2   ). Therefore, li = lfa > lc when  > 1 and li = lfa < lc when
 < 1.
5 Monetary Policy under Alternative Asset Market
Structures
We proceed by characterizing the optimal plan under the assumption that policymak-
ers can commit to maximizing the small open economys welfare. The policy problem
consists of minimizing the loss function given the equilibrium conditions and the initial
conditions t0 and yt0.
16 In the case of complete markets and nancial autarky, the
policymakers choose the path of ft; yt; ct; qtg in order to minimize (31), subject to the
equilibrium conditions given by Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The rst order conditions
to the minimization problem can be written in the form of the following targeting rules:
Qcy(yt   yT;ct ) +Qcq(qt   qT;ct ) +Qct = 0 (32)
and
Qfay (yt   yT;fat ) +Qfaq (qt   qT;fat ) +Qfa t = 0; (33)
where  denotes rst di¤erence operator, the superscript c denotes the complete market
case and fa refers to the nancial autarky setting. The above targeting rules set the
objectives for monetary policy. This is done by specifying the targets yTt and q
T
t as
functions of the di¤erent shocks.
In the case of incomplete markets, the policy problem consists of choosing the path of
ft; yt; ct; qt; btg in order to minimize (31) subject to the equations specied in Table 3.
The characterization of the optimal policy under incomplete markets is more complicated
because of the intertemporal representation of the constraints (IM) and (IM0). The
presence of intermediation costs also adds to the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless,
in the special case in which there are no intermediation costs involved in the international
trade of bonds (i.e.  = 0), the rst order conditions of the policy problem imply
QiyEt(yt+1   yT;it+1) +QiqEt(qt+1   qT;it+1) +QiEtt+1 = 0:17 (34)
The general formulation of the optimal rule is similar under the di¤erent asset market
structures. According to these rules, policymakers should respond to real exchange rate
16In e¤ect, the constraints on the initial conditions impose that the rst order conditions to the problem
are time invariant. This method follows Woodfords (1999) timeless perspective approach and ensures
that the policy prescription does not constitute a time inconsistent problem.
17We should note that Equation (34) is not a targeting rule, since economic dynamics are not deter-
mined under this rule. The monetary policy plan which determines the optimal evolution of variables
under incomplete markets is given by the rst order conditions of the policy problem.
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and output movements, as well as ination. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients Qy; Qq and Q
vary with the structure of the asset market. Such coe¢ cients depend on the weights of
output, the real exchange rate and ination in the loss function, which, in turn depend
on the asset market structure.
However, as previously stated, when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is
unitary, the dynamics of the small open economy are independent of the asset market
structure. Under this specication, the rst order conditions of the policy problem - for
every asset market structure - can be expressed as:
0 = (yt   y0t) + t (35)
where y0t coincides with the exible price allocation for output when markup shocks are
absent. Therefore, under this parameterization, a policy of complete domestic price
stabilization closes the welfare relevant output gap. In other words, it is optimal to
target producer price ination regardless of the asset market structure. This result would
not hold in the presence of markup shocks, since, as emphasized in the closed economy
literature, these shocks introduce ine¢ ciencies in the exible price allocation.18
5.1 Evaluating monetary policy
After presenting the formulation of the optimal monetary policy analytically, we now
evaluate the performance of optimal policy numerically. In particular, we examine how
the degree of exchange rate and price stabilization prescribed by the optimal policy varies
with the asset market specication. Since the implementation of the optimal rule may
not be straightforward in practice (either because the targets are di¢ cult to monitor - i.e.
yTt and q
T
t depend on unobservable shocks - or because the weights are complex functions
of structural parameters), we also evaluate the performances of simple policy rules. Table
6 presents the benchmark specication for the parameter values used in our numerical
exercises.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Figures 1-3 shows the response of output, real exchange rate, consumption and in-
ation following a productivity shock, for the di¤erent asset market structures. Impulse
responses are shown for the case in which the monetary authority is following the optimal
plan (darker lines) and the case in which the central bank is targeting domestic ination
(lighter lines). In all cases, the increase in productivity leads to a higher output and a
depreciation of the real exchange rate (as domestic goods become relatively cheaper in the
face of higher supply). International risk sharing implies that consumption increases less
then output. The di¤erence between output and consumption is larger under nancial
autarky, given that in this case risk sharing only occurs via international relative prices.
The plots demonstrate that, even though quantitatively optimal policy deviations
from price stability are quite small, there are some interesting qualitative di¤erences.
Under complete markets, relative to a policy of price stability, optimal monetary policy
restricts movement in output and reduces the necessary movements in real exchange rate
when goods are substitutes in the utility ( > 1). The opposite is true when goods are
complements in the utility ( < 1). In this case, the level of exchange rate stabilization
is higher than under price stability.
18See Woodford (2003) for a discussion.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The results are completely reversed when risk sharing is not optimal. Under in-
complete markets or nancial autarky, optimal policy reduces the volatility of the real
exchange rate, relative to a policy that targets producer price ination, when goods are
complements rather than substitutes in the utility. These ndings are summarized in
Table 7, which compares the volatility of the real exchange rate under the optimal rule
and under a policy of domestic price stability for the di¤erent asset market specications.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
[Insert Table 7 about here]
5.1.1 Understanding the results
The economic rationale for these results is similar to the one presented in Section 4. In this
section we have seen that an appreciated real exchange rate on average can have a positive
e¤ect on welfare when asset markets are complete and the elasticity of substitution is
high or when asset markets are incomplete and this elasticity is low. So, in order to
understand the results above, we need to spell out how stabilization policy a¤ects the
average level of the real exchange rate. A second order approximation of the equilibrium
conditions can provide an analytical solution of how the rst moment (or the mean) of
variables is a¤ected by the second moment (or the variance) of these variables. In e¤ect,
these approximations can pin down the implications of policies with di¤erent degrees of
ination and exchange rate volatility for the mean of the real exchange rate.
It follows that, regardless of the asset market structure, a policy that lowers the
volatility of the real exchange rate at the expense of higher ination volatility tends to
be associated with a lower level of output and a more appreciated real exchange rate on
average. Why? One of the reasons is given by the fact that a less volatile real exchange
rates tends to increase demand for imports relative to domestic goods. This link between
demand and the variance of the real exchange rate can be seen by inspection of the second
order approximations of the demand. But the denite link between stabilization policy
and the average level of the real exchange rate, also depends on how the degree of exchange
rate/ination volatility a¤ects the price index, supply and risk sharing conditions. Figure
4 illustrate this relationship numerically for the case of complete markets and nancial
autarky. It conrms that the mean of the real exchange rate, E(q), falls (appreciates)
when the central bank (following a rule of the type t + qt) raises the degree of real
exchange rate stabilization (i.e.  increases).
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
So, as Figure 1 demonstrates, when asset markets are complete and goods are sub-
stitutes, optimal policy over-stabilizes the real exchange rate relative to its exible price
allocation. A less volatile real exchange rate tends to increase demand for imports relative
to domestic goods. In equilibrium, the small open economy experiences lower domestic
demand, lower output and a more appreciated exchange rate on average. The policy
e¤ectively diverts some output production to the foreign economy and therefore reduces
the disutility of producing at home. At the same time, the complete market specication
ensures that consumption at home does not su¤er signicantly with the policy of diverting
production.
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Moreover, when domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes to each other, the
decrease in output and production disutility will be larger and the welfare benets for
the real exchange rate stabilization policy higher. This reasoning explains why, as shown
in Table 8, when the elasticity of substitution between the goods is large enough, a policy
that completely stabilize the nominal exchange rate a policy can outperform an ination
targeting regime. But when goods are complements, however, it is no longer possible
to shift consumption towards foreign goods by inducing a greater appreciation in the
exchange rate. In this case, domestic ination targeting is the preferred policy rule
[Insert Table 8 about here]
In the case of incomplete markets, there is a greater link between consumption and
output. In the extreme case of nancial autarky, for example, consumption has to be
fully nanced by domestic production. Consequently, a policy that tries to reduce the
disutility of production will inevitably reduce consumption utility. When the elasticity
of substitution between the goods is high, restricting the exchange rate movements (and
engineering a more appreciated real exchange rate on average) has a strong impact on
output and, consequently, on consumption. Therefore, it does not lead to welfare gains.
In this case, as also illustrated Table 8, a policy that focus on stabilizing ination and
on minimizing the distortions that price dispersion brings, leads to higher welfare then a
policy that perfectly stabilizes the nominal exchange rate.
On the other hand, lowering the degree of substitutability between the goods reduces
output sensitivity to real exchange rate movements. Hence, the income e¤ect on con-
sumption of the appreciation is smaller. In addition, a relatively appreciated exchange
rate can improve the small open economys purchasing power under market incomplete-
ness (see equations (FA) and (IM)). When the elasticity of substitution between goods
is su¢ ciently low, the income e¤ect in consumption is small and therefore its negative
impact on welfare is smaller than the positive welfare e¤ect from an improvement in pur-
chasing power. Hence, in this case, an exchange rate peg outperforms a domestic ination
target.
Note that the ndings presented in Tables 7 and 8 are entirely consistent with the
results shown in Section 4.1. In this section we demonstrate that, when home and foreign
goods are substitutes in utility, the coe¢ cient of ination variability in the loss function is
smaller under perfect risk sharing than it is under incomplete markets, while the opposite
holds when the goods are complementary to one another. The numerical value of these
coe¢ cients are presented in Table 9.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
5.1.2 Quantifying the results
In this section we aim at quantifying the signicance of the results presented above.
In particular, we compare the welfare costs of di¤erent policy rules, conduct sensitivity
analyses considering di¤erent parameter values, and evaluated the robustness of specic
policy rules.19 Moreover, we contrast the performance of domestic ination targeted with
19Note that in what follows we compare welfare between di¤erent policy specications, conditional on
a given asset market specication. Our aim is not to compare welfare between di¤erent asset market
structures. For a study that does that in a monetary union setting, see Auray and Eyquem (2008). A
similar welfare comparison in a small open economy setting requires a careful analysis of the welfare
approximation, as illustrated in Kim and Kim (2003). Although our fully quadratic characterization of
the loss function allows for this analysis, we leave it for future research.
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the optimal policy, and evaluate how signicant are the di¤erences in optimal policy
across asset market structures.
First, we examine the relative performance of simple policy rules under alternative
asset market structures. In particular, we present the di¤erences in welfare, measured
as percentage of a permanent shift in steady-state consumption, between a policy that
targets domestic (or PPI) ination and one that follows a xed exchange rate regime (or
PEG). We do not show the performance of CPI targeting given that this policy is not
the preferred one in any calibration considered. As in Table 8, we consider values for
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ranging from 0.5 to 6. Although most of the
recent literature tend to consider an elasticity of intratemporal substitution above unit,
there is still some mixed evidence in the literature. For example, Rabanal and Tuesta
(2006) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) estimate, using Bayesian techniques, values for
elasticity of substitution well below unity. Heathcote and Perri (2002) estimate a value of
0.9. On the other hand, in Broda and Weinstein (2005) the mean estimates are between
4 and 6. Also, recent work by Imbs and Mejean (2009), suggests that evidence from
disaggregated data points to estimates of around 5.20
As Table 8 illustrates, when asset markets are complete, an exchange rate PEG can
lead to higher welfare when the elasticity of substitution is signicantly high. But the
quantitative results presented in Table 10 show that the di¤erences in welfare associated
with a PPI relative to a PEG are of, at most, 0:02% of steady state consumption (this
is the case when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is set to 6). When risk-
sharing is suboptimal, a PEG outperforms a PPI targeting regime when the elasticity of
substitution between goods is low, and the di¤erence in welfare reaches 0:138% of steady
state consumption when the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is 0:5.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
In our benchmark calibration, we consider a logarithm utility function - that is, we
assume that the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, denoted by , is unitary. While this assump-
tion is somewhat common in the real business cycle literature, the literature suggests a
larger number for this coe¢ cient (for example, Chari at al (2002) consider a value as
large as 6). Therefore, given that our welfare derivations assume a general constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, we can conduct further sensitivity analysis for
higher values of the coe¢ cient of risk aversion. As shown in Table 11, since increasing the
degree of risk aversion raises the costs of economic uctuations, it increases the welfare
losses associated with inferior rules (that is, it raises the absolute values of the numbers
presented in Table 11).21
[Insert Table 11 about here]
As emphasized in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), changing the
degree of ine¢ ciency in steady-state output created by monopolistic competition can
alter the design of monetary policy in closed economies. So our sensitivity analysis
20See Bodenstein (2008) for a comprehensive discussion on this empirical literature.
21As previously discussed, when utility is not log, goods are substitutes (complements) in the utility
when  > 1 ( < 1). But in the general case of CRRA utility, this condition also depends on : So
changing the degree of risk aversion can also change the ranking of policy rules. For example, some
further sensitivity tests suggest that if markets are complete and  takes a value of 4 or 6; in contrast
with the results of Table 8, a PEG might outperform a PPI even if  is as low as 2.
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also considers di¤erent levels of steady-state markup . Table 11 illustrates that the
welfare benet of restricting exchange rate movements tends to fall (and the relative
performance of PPI relative to PEG tends to improve) with the level of steady state
markup. This is because, a higher level of steady-state markup increases the size of
the internal monopolistic distortion and the degree of ine¢ ciency in the level of output
supplied by rms. So, as in a closed economy, increasing  raises the policy incentives
to engineer a higher level of output as to o¤set the internal monopolistic distortion. As
discussed in the open economy literature (see, for example, Tille (2001)), these incentives
then counterbalance the ones coming from the presence of the external distortion. That
is, the welfare gains from o¤setting the internal distortion counterbalance the benets of
inducing an equilibrium allocation in which the real exchange rate is more appreciated
(and, in which, output would be lower). As a result, increasing  reduces the net benets
from restricting exchange rate movements.
Table 11 also examines the implications for the performance of policy rules of lower
levels of the elasticity of labour supply, i.e. higher values of . Our benchmark calibration
assumes  = 0:47, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), but works such as Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2008) point to values as high as 6. Our results reveal that the relative
performance of PPI increases with . The previous section highlights that a policy of
restricting exchange rate movements (and switching consumption towards foreign goods)
can improve welfare by reducing the disutility of producing domestically. But as labour
becomes more inelastic, this e¤ect dissipates, and the performance of a policy that con-
centrates on domestic price stability improves.22 Finally, as shown in Table 11, reducing
the degree of openness also decreases the incentive to exploit the terms of trade exter-
nality and improves the performance of an inward looking policy such as PPI relative to
PEG.23
The results above suggest that domestic ination targeting tends to outperform a
PEG for most parameter values considered, unless the degree of substitutability between
the goods takes values close to the bounds of the range considered. Moreover, the relative
performance of PPI improves if we consider larger distortions in output due to monopo-
listic competition, less elastic labour supply, or lower degrees of openness. But how does
domestic ination targeting performs relative to the optimal policy?
As previously illustrated in Figures 1-3, although the optimal policy plan and a PPI
ination targeting regime imply di¤erent levels of exchange rate stabilization, these poli-
cies lead to very similar economic dynamics following productivity shocks. In line with
these results, Table 12 shows that the welfare costs of implementing a policy that targets
PPI ination rather than the optimal policy are smaller than 0.0004% of steady-state
consumption. So these ndings generalize the results illustrated in Figures 1-3, suggest-
ing that PPI ination targeting lead to small welfare costs when the economy is subject
to all types of shocks.24 We should note, however, that the welfare losses presented in
22This result is consistent with the ndings of Cova and Søndergaard (2004).
23We have also conducted some sensitivity analysis varying the level of steady state net foreign assets
in the case of incomplete markets. Nevertheless, these did not have notable implications for the ranking
performance of di¤erent policy rules.
24Note that Table 12, as well as the other tables assessing the performance of di¤erent rules, assumes
that the stochastic environment is characterized by the presence of all shocks. But the same qualitative
results would hold if we rank policy rules conditional on the presence of only productivity shocks, only
scal shocks or only external shocks. Markup shocks e¤ectively introduce ine¢ cient uctuations in the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and goods production, so stabilizing such uctuations
is another objective of stabilization policy. Thus, the presence of such shocks tends to deteriorate the
19
Tables 10-12 are of a similar order of magnitude as the costs of business cycles reported
by Lucas (1987), and are comparable to others found in similar exercises in the literature
(see, for example Benigno (2009)).
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Our nal exercise evaluates the welfare implications of designing policies under in-
correct assumptions for level of asset market sophistication. For example, suppose that
the small open economy is initially operating under nancial autarky and the monetary
authority is using the optimal policy designed for this asset market specication. The
economy then opens up to international asset trading, and nominal bonds become traded,
but monetary policy remains the same. How big is the loss from not changing the opti-
mal policy to take into account that agents can trades bonds? This is shown in the rst
column of Table 13. The next column than compares the welfare costs of maintaining
a policy designed for nancial autarky, in an economy with access to a complete set of
contingent claims. Finally, the nal column analyze the opposite scenario. Again, the
implications of adopting suboptimal policies for welfare are quantitatively small. This
result is not surprising given that, under the calibrations considered in Table 13, optimal
policy resembles closely a policy of producer price ination targeting, regardless of the
asset market structure.25
[Insert Table 13 about here]
6 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we formalize the dynamics of the small open economy under di¤erent degrees
of international risk sharing and show that these have direct implications for monetary
policy. Optimal monetary policy is independent of the nancial market structure only
when the latter is entirely irrelevant for the economys dynamics. This is the case when
trade imbalances are ruled out and the steady-state level of net foreign assets is zero.
Under this specication, and provided there are no markup shocks or steady-state ine¢ -
ciencies in output, domestic price stability coincides with the optimal plan, regardless of
the degree of risk sharing.
But in general the optimal level of stabilization of domestic prices or exchange rates
varies with the asset market structure and the degree of substitutability between goods.
When a country can optimally share risk with the rest of the world, and home and foreign
goods are substitutes, restricting real exchange rate volatility may improve its welfare.
But under imperfect risk sharing, these results are entirely reversed.
These ndings suggest that countries with di¤erences import proles and di¤erent as-
set market characteristics could benet from di¤erent policy specications. Having said
that, our results suggest that, although qualitatively interesting, the quantitative implica-
tions of these factors for the performance of di¤erent policies are not large. In particular,
our numerical results suggest that welfare costs of adopting a domestic ination targeting
appear to be small for most parameter values considered. But, as underlined in Lucas
(1987), small welfare costs of macroeconomic uctuations appear to be a feature of most
models of this class.
performance of simple rules relative to the optimal policy.
25We do not present quantitative assessments of the optimal rule for extreme values of  because, in
these cases, the second order conditions of the optimal policy problem may not be satised.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Equilibrium Conditions under Complete Markets
t = k(ct + yt +

1 qt   "t + t) + Ett+1 AS
yt = (1  )ct + ct + qt + gt AD
ct = c

t + qt CM
Table 2: Equilibrium Conditions under Financial Autarky
t = k(ct + yt +

1 qt   "t + t) + Ett+1 AS
yt = (1  )ct + ct + qt + gt AD
yt   1 qt = ct FA
Table 3: Equilibrium Conditions under Incomplete Markets
t = k(ct + yt +

1 qt   "t + t) + Ett+1 AS
yt = (1  )ct + ct + qt + gt AD
Et(ct+1   ct) = Et(ct+1   ct ) + Etqt+1   bt IM
bt = bt 1 + yt   ct   1 qt IM0
Table 4: Model parameters
 Intratemporal elasticity of substitution
 1 Elasticity of labor production
 Degree of openness
 Subjective discount factor
 Elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products
 Sensitivity of intermediation costs to the level of foreign debt
k (1  )(1  )=(1 + )
 (2  )=(1  )
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Table 5: Foreign Equilibrium Conditions
t = k(c

t + y

t   "t + t ) + Ett+1 AS
yt = c

t + g

t AD

Table 6: Parameter values used in the quantitative analysis
Parameter Value Notes:
 0:99 Specifying a quarterly model with 4% steady-state real interest rate
 0:47 Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
 0:25 (unless specied otherwise)
 0:66 Characterizing an average length of price contract of 3 quarters
 10 Following Benigno and Woodford (2005)
 1:5 (unless specied otherwise)
 0:01 Benigno (2009)
sdv("^) 0:0071 Consistent with Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Kehoe and Perri (2002)
sdv(g^) 0:0062 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
sdv(^) 0:0013 Consistent with Adolfson at al (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2003)
sdv(C^

) 0:0129 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)
("), (C
) 0:66 Following Gali and Monacelli (2005)
(g) 0:94 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
() 0:99 Following Adolfson at al (2007)
Productivity shocks
Optimal risk sharing Sub-optimal risk sharing
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets Financial Autarky
 = 2 varopt(Qt)<varppi(Qt) varopt(Qt)>varppi(Qt) varopt(Qt)>varppi(Qt)
 = 0:8 varopt(Qt)>varppi(Qt) varopt(Qt)<varppi(Qt) varopt(Qt)<varppi(Qt)
Table 7: Volatility of the Real Exchange Rate under the Optimal Rule vs. Producer
Price Ination Targeting
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Welfare ranking
Optimal risk sharing Sub-optimal risk sharing
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets Financial Autarky
Substitute Goods  = 6 PEG PPI PPI
 = 4 PEG PPI PPI
 = 2 PPI PPI PPI
 = 1 PPI PPI PPI
Complementary Goods  = 0:8 PPI PPI PPI
 = 0:7 PPI PPI PPI
 = 0:6 PPI PEG PEG
 = 0:5 PPI PEG PEG
Table 8: Welfare ranking of producer price ination (PPI) targeting, consumer price
ination (CPI) targeting and xed exchange rate regime (or PEG), when the economy is
subject to productivity, markup, scal and external shocks.
Complete Markets lc Incomplete Markets l
i
 Financial Autarky l
fa

 = 0:8 217  = 0:8 131  = 0:8 131
 = 1 191  = 1 191  = 1 191
 = 2 89  = 2 270  = 2 270
Table 9: Loss function coe¢ cients
Welfare costs: Producer Price Ination Targeting vs Exchange rate Peg
Optimal risk sharing Sub-optimal risk sharing
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets Financial Autarky
Substitute Goods  = 6 0.019 -0.026 -0.011
 = 4 0.008 -0.028 -0.016
 = 2 -0.011 -0.032 -0.024
 = 1 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027
Complementary Goods  = 0:8 -0.031 -0.020 -0.020
 = 0:7 -0.034 -0.010 -0.008
 = 0:6 -0.036 0.014 0.023
 = 0:5 -0.038 0.097 0.138
Table 10: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock
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Welfare costs: Producer Price Ination Targeting vs Exchange rate Peg
Optimal risk sharing Sub-optimal risk sharing
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets Financial Autarky
Risk Aversion = 1 -0.019 -0.031 -0.027
= 2 -0.024 -0.066 -0.043
= 3 -0.031 -0.115 -0.059
= 4 -0.038 -0.178 -0.075
Steady-state = 1 -0.014 -0.031 -0.026
Markup = 1:66 -0.019 -0.031 -0.027
= 2 -0.020 -0.032 -0.027
Labor Supply  1= 1=0:47 -0.019 -0.031 -0.027
Elasticity  1= 1 -0.028 -0.046 -0.041
 1= 1=3 -0.071 -0.109 -0.102
 1= 1=6 -0.139 -0.210 -0.199
Openness = 0:4 -0.019 -0.031 -0.027
= 0:2 -0.031 -0.036 -0.030
= 0:1 -0.039 -0.039 -0.031
Table 11: Preferred Policy Rule following a Productivity Shock
Welfare costs: Optimal Policy vs Producer Price Ination Targeting
Optimal risk sharing Sub-optimal risk sharing
Complete Markets Incomplete Markets Financial Autarky
 = 2 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001
 = 0:8 -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0002
Table 12: Welfare costs of PPI ination targeting relative to the optimal policy regime
Welfare costs of suboptimal policies
LIncomp:Incomp:   LIncomp:F: Aut: LComp:Comp:   LComp:F: Aut: LF: Aut:F: Aut:   LF: Aut:Comp:
 = 2 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009
 = 0:8 -0.00003 -0.0003 -0.0001
Table 13: LAB indicates the loss function of an economy under asset market structure A
that uses a policy designed for an economy under asset market structure B.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses, Complete Markets Case
Figure 2: Impulse responses, Incomplete Markets Case
25
Figure 3: Impulse responses, Financial Autarky Case
Figure 4: Average Real Exchange Rate. The stochastic environment is characterized by
the presence of productivity, markup, scal and external shocks.
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